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Introduction
This paper explores the use of  challenge competitions as 
tools for economic development. More specifically, the 
paper examines the use of  such models to foster the 
growth of  the entrepreneurship and innovation eco-
system in New York City from the period 2008-2019.
It does not seek to evaluate empirically the effective-
ness of  these approaches, but instead is intended to 
offer municipal policymakers and other stakeholders 
a frame of  reference for considering if, when and 
how to deploy one particular tool in the economic 
development toolbox.
The scope of  the analysis covers the key policy driv-
ers for the use of  competition models commencing 
in the Bloomberg Administration, their design, the 
adoption and evolution of  such models in the de Bla-
sio Administration, and the co-opting of  the model 
by a major corporate entity, Amazon, in their recent 
‘HQ2’ bid process.
While not a panacea, prize competitions in their var-
ious forms can be an effective mechanism to uncover 
privately held market data in a cost-efficient manner, 
leverage significant counterparty investment with a 
limited set of  public or private resources, source novel 
ideas and market-based solutions, and generate public 
engagement and mobilization.
However, if  not carefully designed they can also result 
in disenfranchisement of  communities and key stake-
holder groups, sub-optimal allocation of  scarce public 
resources, ‘race to the bottom’ dynamics, and privat-
ization of  public resources in a way which favors near-
term gain over long-term stewardship.
Given the above, the prize competition is a power-
ful tool for economic development policymakers but 
one which should be used sparingly and with careful 
consideration of  unintended consequences. At their 
best, such competitions are open, inclusive and tar-
geted at a problem which cannot otherwise be read-
ily solved using other more traditional approaches.
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Definition of Prize  
Competition Models
By ‘prize competition models,’ we refer to the use of  
open, large scale competitive processes where enti-
ties (usually companies, institutions, or investors) are 
invited and incentivized to propose a novel prob-
lem-solving activity where the merits of  those respec-
tive proposals are judged relative to one another by 
those running the competition.
Typically, in economic development, the incentive takes 
the form of  a ‘prize,’ which could be financial support, 
access to a scarce public resource (e.g. land), and, impor-
tantly, public recognition. In return, competitors are 
expected to do that which is transformative, i.e. having 
a broader systemic impact on the economy or produc-
ing a highly innovative solution to a major challenge.
Additionally, one important subset of  such compe-
tition models seeks to solve ‘wicked problems’ —
extremely challenging public policy issues which for a 
long time have defied solutions due to their complex-
ity, interdependencies, and the requirement for multi-
ple stakeholders to change their behavior.
Use of  challenge competition models by governments 
is far from new, particularly at the intersection of  eco-
nomic development and technological innovation.
In 1714 the British government offered a series of  
prizes ranging from $10,000-$20,000 ($2 million to $4 
million in 2018 dollars) to anyone who could provide a 
reliable, robust solution to the challenge of  determin-
ing longitude at sea. The work of  Yorkshire craftsman 
John Harrison on successive solutions to this hitherto 
intractable problem resulted, in 1761, with the submis-
sion of  his ‘H4’ chronometer to the prize committee 
and the subsequent “open sourcing” by the Board of  
Longitude in 1767 of  his designs which remained the 
de facto standard for maritime navigation devices for 
more than a century.1
Determining a solution to establishing longitude at sea 
was far from an academic exercise on the part of  the 
British government. It was, in fact, the most pressing 
economic development issue of  day. Controversial as 
the resultant history may be, in a world where national 
wealth depended on seeking out new maritime trade 
routes, securing the ability to accurately navigate the 
sea conferred a tremendous competitive advantage.
Much more recently, several cities and nations have 
used challenge models in an attempt to unlock eco-
nomic growth. The remainder of  this paper examines 
some specific cases of  their use in New York City under 
both the Bloomberg and the de Blasio Administra-
tions, briefly touches on their adoption elsewhere, and 
concludes by looking at a recent flipping of  the model 
in terms of  the Amazon HQ2 competition.
Traditional Approaches to  
Economic Development
In New York City, as in many large cities around the 
US, in the period before the 2000’s economic develop-
ment was often based around tax incentives.
This traditional approach tries, by reduction or elim-
ination of  certain taxes, to make a location more 
attractive for a company and hence to either retain 
the associated jobs, expand them, or capture new jobs 
through attraction of  companies to the jurisdiction.
The tax incentives involved, particularly at a municipal 
level, are often those levied on real estate. In New York 
City the ability of  the city government to alter tax struc-
tures is constrained but for those related to real estate. 
Under the rubric of  cities as creatures of  the state,2 the abil-
ity to independently set tax policy is fundamentally lim-
ited by preemption. NYC can set only Real Property Tax 
rates without NYS legislative and gubernatorial approval, 
and can also, via entities enabled by State legislation such 
as the Industrial Development Agency (which as a prac-
tical matter is run by the City’s Economic Development 
Corporation) use Payments in Lieu of  Taxes (PILOTs) to 
change the tax structure of  a specific property.3
This approach, while having validity in certain circum-
stances, pre-supposes that company location decisions 
are heavily influenced by the cost of  developing and 
operating physical facilities. While it is true on the mar-
gin that reducing the cost of  office or factory space 
could cause a company to decide to locate or expand in 
a given location, the reality is that in the modern econ-
omy company location decisions are far more complex.
In particular in cities like NYC, where the economy 
over time has skewed far more towards ‘knowledge’ 
based industries, access to a pool of  well qualified tal-
ent, reliability of  infrastructure (e.g. transit), and qual-
ity of  life (parks, schools, culture) are often more key. 
NYC’s geographic factors—land constrained, dense, 
bordered by NJ—mean that competing on the basis 
of  real estate tax incentives inevitably becomes a zero-
sum game and a race to the bottom.
Nevertheless, under the Giuliani administration, for 
example, NYC granted billions of  dollars4 of  tax 
incentives through the IDA and the NYCEDC. These 
primarily went to retention deals, in an effort to ensure 
that jobs in financial services—long the bedrock of  
New York’s economy (representing roughly one third 
of  income tax revenues)—remained in the city at a 
time when cost pressures, globalization, and technol-
ogy changes were causing banks, insurance companies 
and other large employers to move back office and sup-
port jobs to lower cost locations.
The purpose of  this paper is not to evaluate the effec-
tiveness or otherwise of  real estate tax incentives, but 
to instead analyze the broader set of  tools used in eco-
nomic development competition models. However, it 
is notable that by the time Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
took office in 2001 policy had already begun to shift 
away from reliance on both as-of-right and discre-
tionary tax incentive structures, or at least attempt to 
deploy them in a more targeted fashion.
A good example of  targeted deployment of  such incen-
tives was the attempt following World Trade Center 
attacks in 2001 to ensure businesses and jobs did not 
flee Lower Manhattan. Geographically targeted incen-
tives such as the Commercial Revitalization Program 
(CRP) and Lower Manhattan Relocation Employment 
Assistance Program (LM-REAP) undoubtedly had 
some impact on commercial rebuilding, but the neigh-
borhood has arguably seen more impact from a change 
from being a primarily commercial CBD to becoming 
far more of  a thriving residential and mixed-use area.
Regardless, even when more targeted the competition 
dynamic in tax incentive mechanisms is inherently 
inter-jurisdictional; New York’s gain is New Jersey’s 
loss, and vice versa.
Bloomberg: The Market Pragmatist
The recovery of  NYC from the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and uncertainty around the future of  jobs and the 
economy undeniably played a role in the election, by 
a narrow margin, of  a self-made technology multi-bil-
lionaire with no prior experience of  political office. 
Mayor Bloomberg in his 2001 campaign ran on, 
amongst other things, his experience as a businessman 
which he would leverage to ensure jobs and companies 
did not flee the city.
Recall that, in addition to the fear caused by the largest 
terrorist attack ever seen on US soil, upon taking office 
the Mayor and his team faced a ~$6 billion budget 
shortfall due to depressed revenues arising from that 
disaster, the bursting of  the first internet bubble and 
the attendant stock market collapse which quickly seg-
ued into the 2002 recession.
One of  Bloomberg’s first actions as Mayor-elect was 
to appoint Daniel Doctoroff 5 as Deputy Mayor for 
Economic Development. Doctoroff, an investment 
banker, had led NYC’s failed bid to host the 2012 
Olympic games. In his recent book, Greater Than Ever: 
New York’s Big Comeback Doctoroff explains how plan-
ning for the Olympic bid influenced Bloomberg eco-
nomic development policy:
“ A big part of  the Olympic vision was to take parts of  
the city used for purposes perhaps well suited to the 
nineteenth—and even most of  the twentieth—century 
New York economy and transform them into vital parts 
of  a growing twenty-first century New York by making 
them into new communities.”
‘Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big Comeback,’ 
Daniel L. Doctoroff, p.70
Not only did the Olympic bid experience help generate 
a blueprint for an economic development strategy, but 
involvement in precisely that type of  large scale, open, 
global competitive bid model would set the tone for 
key competition-based policies and initiatives later on.
One important feature of  an attempt to augment tax 
incentive-based competition which emerged fairly 
early in Bloomberg’s tenure was an emphasis on diver-
sification. As a sophisticated businessman who had 
made his fortune serving the financial services industry, 
he recognized the importance of  a diversified portfolio 
to smooth out risk.
The NYC economy had for long been over-indexed on 
the banking and finance sector as well as to large multi-
nationals in general. This resulted in amplifications of  
the boom-bust cycle, with the city thriving when Wall 
Street did well and hurting when markets crashed. It 
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also led to over-concentration of  economic activity in 
the Manhattan Central Business Districts.
By 2005, therefore, the Administration had developed 
a policy platform which attempted to diversify the 
economy by growing sectors other than finance, and to 
spread that activity to other parts of  the city. The Five 
Borough Economic Development Plan6 explicitly set 
objectives around diversifying the economy and build-
ing commercial centers in all five boroughs.
Of  course, the Bloomberg Administration also made 
extensive use of  tax incentives and debt-based financ-
ings, often to undertake large scale redevelopment 
which it claimed would add to the infrastructure of  the 
city. Most controversial of  these efforts were probably 
the incentives given to create new stadia for both the 
Mets and the Yankees baseball teams.
Bloomberg (Response to the  
2008 Financial Crisis)
In 2008, the Bloomberg Administration was nearing 
the end of  what at that time was the Mayor’s final 
term. In the preceding few years, the economy had 
been booming but storm clouds were on the horizon. 
On September 15th, the markets opened to the news 
that Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy.
Faced with a global financial crisis, Mayor Bloomberg 
and his economic development team began to dou-
ble down on previous attempts at economic diversifi-
cation. Unsure of  how deep the downturn would be 
or how long it would last, one initial concern was to 
ensure that talent, upon which a modern economy like 
that of  NYC had come to rely so heavily, did not flee 
the city in droves.
Another concern was to figure out where jobs for the 
recovery would come from, and how to best support 
that growth—in particular how to support high growth 
potential startups which could rapidly replace jobs 
being lost in financial services.
To address both these issues, in 2009 under the lead-
ership of  newly-appointed President Seth Pinsky 
the Economic Development Corporation began to 
develop and launch various programs and strategies to 
foster entrepreneurship and grow multiple key indus-
tries, including the nascent tech sector.
NYC had a brief  flirtation with tech in the Silicon 
Alley days of  the first internet boom, but aside from 
a few success stories (notably, the acquisition of  Dou-
bleClick by Google in 2007 for $3.1 billion) the indus-
try had never taken root and largely remained in the 
shadow of  the more traditional FIRE (Finance, Insur-
ance, Real Estate) sectors.
Recognizing that large corporates were likely to 
remain in retrenchment mode for some time and that 
tech was increasingly disrupting key NYC sectors such 
as media, healthcare, and even fashion, the EDC team 
developed packages of  programs, often as part of  an 
industry-focused “2020” plan, to support innovation 
and entrepreneurship.
An important tool in these efforts was the use of  
competition models to incent startup formation and 
increase engagement by some of  those recently laid-
off by the investment banks.
Leveraging Public Datasets:  
Big Apps
For example, in 2009 the NYCEDC launched New 
York City’s first Big Apps competition. By collecting a 
cross-section of  data from multiple city agencies and 
challenging developers to use that data to build new 
apps, the hope was to engage more talented people in 
technology, profile the City’s leadership in that space, 
attract interest from companies and investors, and 
anchor some startup activity.
Big Apps is now in its 8th year and has evolved signifi-
cantly since launch. Similar competition models based 
around municipal data have become commonplace 
as part of  a drive towards open data standards and 
civic tech/municipal hacking. But the basic principles 
of  this competition model for economic development 
have remained unchanged.
By offering relatively modest prize-based incentives 
(in the case of  Big Apps, total cash awards have not 
exceeded ~$150,000) leveraging a public resource 
(initially, municipal data sets, and later access to city 
agency pilot programs) to solve important civic prob-
lems, and doing so in an open competition model, cities 
have been able to create momentum around entrepre-
neurship and startup, reap the benefits of  solutions 
provided by multiple participants—effectively crowd 
sourcing solutions—and in some cases unlocking gen-
uine breakthroughs in innovation.
While competition-based initiatives and sector-focused 
programs provided helpful signaling, the Bloomberg 
economic development team was conscious that 
something larger scale and more systemic would be 
required to really move the needle on NYC’s ~$1.5 
trillion economy.
After obtaining extensive input from industry leaders, 
think tanks and other stakeholders, the Administration 
identified both the scale and quality of  technology tal-
ent and IP transfer as critical components which would 
be needed to fuel the recovery and build the NYC 
economy of  the future.
To address this, they turned again to a competition 
mechanism, and in December 2010 they launched 
Applied Sciences NYC. Positioned as a “challenge to top institu-
tions from around the world to propose a new or expanded applied 
sciences campus in New York City,”7 the City offered $100M 
in funding and a variety of  city-owned properties on 
which to build. The process was intentionally designed 
to leverage many of  the features of  competition models:
Presidents of  a select pool of  academic establishments 
each received a personal letter signed by the Mayor invit-
ing them to participate, leading to a sense of  exclusivity.
Selection was structured in rounds, with an initial 
phase (RFEI) to build interest and excitement leading 
to a subsequent more detailed phase (RFP).
A timeline was established, underpinned by the ticking 
clock counting down to the end of  Mayor Bloomberg’s 
third term8 in office, creating a sense of  urgency 
amongst participants. The Administration played up 
this urgency, having the Mayor describe it as a “once 
in a generation opportunity.” 9
Significant effort was undertaken to make aspects of  
the process ‘public’: for example, during the RFEI 
phase Presidents and Provosts from interested insti-
tutions were invited to the city for a two-day program 
of  ‘informational’ events, which included a recep-
tion at the Met, breakfast at City Hall, a presenta-
tion and lunch in boardroom of  the New York Stock 
Exchange, and tours of  the city-owned sites. These 
events served to intensify the sense of  competition 
amongst the institutions (and hence the perceived 
value of  being a winner), raised the public profile of  
the contest, and sell the benefits of  being part of  all 
that NYC has to offer.
As mentioned previously, one benefit to economic 
developers of  such competition models is the ability 
to benefit from the work and insights of  multiple par-
ticipants. Depending on the competition dynamic, this 
can be structured in a more or a less formal way. In 
some cases, there are gold, silver and bronze prizes. 
Often, as a condition of  participating, respondents are 
required to acknowledge that their contributions may 
be used even if  they are not the ‘winner.’
Creating multiple ‘tracks’ is another popular approach. 
In the case of  Big Apps, what began as a broadly 
defined competition (the City made various dataset 
available; developers were invited to build apps, and 
various awards were made based on selection mecha-
nism such as “popular choice” and “investors choice”) 
matured over time into a very structured program with 
various tracks focused on key problems the city faced 
such as “Affordable Housing Challenge” and “Civic 
Engagement Challenge.”
In all these cases, from an economic development 
point of  view the competition organizers (NYCEDC) 
and the city benefit from all of  the time, energy and 
resources put into the competition by all the partic-
ipants for a relatively small investment in prizes and 
incentives on the part of  that organizer.
In the case of  Applied Sciences NYC, while during the 
competition the organizers created a sense of  ‘winner 
take all’ to ensure participants placed their best offers 
on the table, the City in fact managed to benefit from 
several of  the responses. After selecting a joint ven-
ture between Cornell University and The Technion to 
create a new campus on Roosevelt Island as the main 
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winner, the City announced several additional projects 
including the creation of  a Data Sciences Institute at 
Columbia University and the creation of  a Center for 
Urban Science and Progress (CUSP) at NYU.
The Bloomberg Administration claimed that together, 
the Applied Sciences projects would contribute over 
$30 billion10 to the NYC economy over 30 years and 
double the number of  engineering graduates. While 
correlation is not causation, the Applied Sciences 
initiative combined with other efforts to strengthen 
NYC’s tech sector coincided with a period of  explosive 
growth 2008 to the present. In a report in 2017, New 
York State Comptroller Tom DiNapolli said 11 “New 
York City has become one of  the most important tech 
hubs in the country.” Greg David, writing in Crain’s12 
and using updated data from the Comptroller’s Office 
claimed in February 2018 that NYC was now “the sec-
tor’s second official city” [after SF] with 7,500 firms 
employing over 120,000 people.
While it is difficult to parse out the overall economic 
impacts of  individual prize-based competitions on an 
economy as large as that of  NYC, it is also undeniable 
that something significant has changed in the city’s 
economy. At time of  writing, NYC has been experi-
encing a record economic boom, with historically low 
unemployment rates and significant jobs growth. The 
recovery which began under Bloomberg has contin-
ued apace under de Blasio and, unlike in previous 
cycles, has been fueled not by financial services but (at 
least in part) by the tech economy.
Source: NYC Tech Ecosystem Report, HR&A Advisors, 2014
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Source: NYC Tech Ecosystem Report, HR&A Advisors, 2014
De Blasio Administration: Inclusion 
and Diversity in Competitions
Most casual observers would agree that Mayor Bill de 
Blasio, who took office in January 2014, was not the 
natural successor to Mike Bloomberg. In a campaign 
which reflected significant frustration felt by many on 
issues of  income disparity, equity and inclusion—the 
‘Tale of  Two Cities’—the de Blasio Administration 
was unlikely to continue business as usual in terms of  
an economic development approach.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, when it comes to the 
use of  competition models there has been a great 
deal of  continuity. In this section, the paper will 
examine how the de Blasio has built on, and in some 
cases improved the use of  prize competitions started 
under Bloomberg, and ways in which the structure of  
those competitions reflect their different political and 
policy priorities.
Again, the Big Apps competition offers an excel-
lent example. As one of  the programs which start-
ing immediately post 2008 financial crisis which is 
still operating today, Table 1 below summarizes they 




2009 Initial pilot. Prizes awarded “overall,” ‘Investors Choice,’ ‘City Talent’ (i.e. City Agencies), ‘Popular Choice  (i.e., Public Vote) and ‘Data Visualization’ categories
2010 Simplified prize structure—“overall” and “Popular Choice” only.
2011 All applications now initially screened by online public vote. Top 25 go to judging. $5,000 prize pot.
2012 Prize pot expanded to $50,000. BMW iVentures joins as anchor sponsor. Introduction of category tracks  (best green app; mobility app; education app. Introduction of special award for mashups of NYC data.
Year Key Elements/Changes
2013 Expansion of prize pot to $150,000. Introduction of a specific focus on “jobs and economic mobility.”  Category tracks in health and lifelong learning
2014 Prize pot reduced to $100,000. Facebook, Ebay, Microsoft and Google join as sponsors.  Four themed tracks (Live, Work, Learn, Play) and three channel apps (mobile, web, game).
2015 Explicit focus on policy priorities—prize tracks in Affordable Housing, Zero Waste,  Connected Cities, and Civic Engagement.
2016 Competition did not run.
2017
Up front support for project design and ideation provided by Civic Hall over 4 months. ESRI, First Republic,  
and LINK NYC/Intersection join as sponsors. Policy specific tracks for Transportation, Knowledge, and 
Community Resiliency. Winners receive admission to Civic Hall Accelerator program and piloting of their  
product, in addition to cash prizes worth $30,000..
It is clear from the above that in 2013 as City Hall 
headed to a transition, the economic development 
teams at EDC which run Big Apps had already begun 
to anticipate ways in which the program might better 
address likely priorities of  the incoming administra-
tion. For example, we see the introduction of  a prize 
track specifically focused on economic mobility. Previ-
ous ‘Bloombergian’ Big Apps contests featured mobil-
ity heavily—but more physical than economic. A 
subway navigation app and Big Apps winner in 2011, 
EmbarkNYC, went on to receive investment from BMW 
Ventures and was subsequently acquired by Apple.
By 2017, we can see the priorities of  the de Blasio 
Administration clearly reflected in Big Apps. Original 
competition organizer ChallengePost (now Devpost), a 
for-profit competition platform founded in 2009 which 
had raised millions of  dollars from angel investors and 
venture capitalists had been replaced by Civic Hall, a 
not-for-profit focused on building collaborative com-
munities and using technology for the public good. 
Competition tracks now included three demographi-
cally-defined ‘foci’—youth, seniors, and immigrants—
and challenge tracks included:
“ Community Resiliency – Building strong communities 
by fostering more inclusion and connection for youth, 
seniors, and immigrants where they live, learn, work, 
and play.”
But the de Blasio Administration did not simply tweak 
existing Bloomberg programs. Under the auspices 
of  the newly created Mayor’s Office for Technology 
and Innovation, led by a newly created Chief  Tech-
nology Officer role, the City has extended the use of  
prize competitions. In October 2017, just ahead of  his 
re-election to a second term, the Mayor and the CTO 
announced NYCx, which was described as
“ a new civic platform…that provides a vehicle for tech 
startups and New Yorkers to invent digital solutions to 
common problems. Crime, traffic, pollution, all issues are 
on the table.” 13
The NYCx platform is current structured around two 
main challenge types—‘moonshots’ and ‘colabs.’ 
Moonshots are defined as citywide challenges for 
entrepreneurs to address with business models, while 
‘colabs’ are focused on engaging community mem-
bers to develop and pilot solutions to problems at a 
local scale. Presently two moonshots address replac-
ing gas-powered vehicles and deploying broadband 
on Governors Island, while two colabs located 
in Brownsville, one of  NYC’s most economically 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, address environmen-
tal stewardship and night-time crime reduction in 
commercial corridors.
These NYCx challenges clearly address issues which 
are broader than those typically the concern of  eco-
nomic development policy, although ultimately there 
is a nexus with job creation and company expansion. 
It is perhaps too early to identify the impact or other-
wise of  these programs, and the CTO role has seen 
significant turnover, with the most recent incumbent 
departing somewhat suddenly after only eighteen 
months, as did his predecessor.
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EDC, traditionally the home for these types of  initia-
tives under the Bloomberg Administration, has also 
not been idle under de Blasio when it comes to the use 
of  the challenge model. In 2016 the Mayor announced 
an EDC-run LifeSci NYC program, which proposes to 
invest $500 million over 10 years to grow a commercial 
life sciences sector in NYC.
Applied Sciences Redux:  
Translational Applied Life Sciences Hub’
The centerpiece of  that program is a challenge to cre-
ate a new ‘Translational Applied Life Sciences Hub.’ With 
$100 million and city-owned sites on offer, an RFEI 
process launched in early 2018 positioned as
“ a historic opportunity….to establish an Applied 
Life Sciences Hub—a world-class facility for life 
sciences research and development.” 14
the initiative draws heavily on Bloomberg’s Applied 
Sciences initiative for inspiration. However, in this as 
in the other continuations of  the prize challenge model 
we can clearly see the policy priorities of  the de Blasio 
Administration reflected. For example, the very first 
program to launch under the LifeSci NYC umbrella 
included a novel program to connect paid interns at 
graduate and undergraduate level with life sciences 
companies. Listed first among the various objectives of  
this program is to:
“Assemble a cohort of  participating interns that reflects the 
diversity of  New York City university students with a special 
focus on students from disadvantaged communities and eco-
nomic backgrounds.” 15
At the time of  writing, the Lifesci NYC Translational 
Applied Life Sciences Hub competition has just gotten 
underway. In May of  2018 the City received responses 
to their RFEI and a subsequent RFP is expected before 
the end of  2018. In the RFEI participants were asked to 
compete on, amongst other things, their commitments 
to subcontract construction work to businesses owned 
by minorities and women (a goal of  25%-35% has been 
set by the City) and to HireNYC, a city-run program 
which attempts to ensure jobs go to people from local 
communities in which new real estate is developed.
Time will tell whether this effort leads to the creation 
of  a new institution on par with Cornell-Tech, which 
opened in August 2017 on Roosevelt Island, and 
whether the NYC life sciences sector experiences the 
type of  growth seen in tech since 2008. But it is clear 
that once again the use of  a challenge competition is a 
key strategy being deployed by economic developers.
National and International 
Competition Models
Note that these challenge models being discussed are 
distinct from competitive procurements which all levels 
of  government routinely undertake. When government 
identifies a need for goods or services, they naturally 
run a bidding process to source the best deal for the 
taxpayer. Often these processes are prescribed by vari-
ous laws and regulations. In certain cases, such as when 
a city disposes of  real estate for a private developer to 
build on, the process can attract a lot of  public scrutiny 
and can be controversial.
But such competitive procurements lack several key 
features common to the types of  competitions that are 
the focus of  this paper. Competitive procurements are 
inherently one-to-one transactions. The buyer (govern-
ment) has often identified in some detail the param-
eters of  the solution being sought and has certainly 
identified in great detail the problem or need to be 
addressed. Government usually cannot make use of  
more than one of  the solutions—there is ultimately 
a contract to provide the solution on the part of  one 
vendor (or, sometimes, a consortium). While varying 
degrees of  transparency may be involved, public rec-
ognition and celebration of  the participants is not gen-
erally a core component or motivator for participants.
Recognizing the many advantages conferred by 
challenge competition approaches, they have been 
adopted at a national and internationally by both gov-
ernments and philanthropy including for economic 
development objectives.
New York: A Global Example
Following the success in New York City of  Bloomberg’s 
Applied Sciences competition, several countries and 
cities around the world borrowed from the playbook 
with similar contests of  their own.
In Amsterdam in 2014, the city government launched 
a competition to encourage the creation of  a similar 
new applied sciences institute. The winning consortium 
received a prize of  $50m euro, with a second prize win-
ner being selected for a smaller $7m euro investment.
At the US Federal Government level, the use of  prize 
challenges to spur innovation issued by technology 
focused agencies including NASA, the DoD, and DoE 
increased dramatically under Obama Administration. 
According to data from Challenge.gov16 (a platform run 
by the successor company to Challengepost which part-
nered with the Bloomberg Administration on the first 
Big Apps contests), there have been more than 825 
challenges run by Federal agencies since 2010 involv-
ing over $250 million in prize funds.
More specific to economic development, Nesta, for-
merly a UK government-affiliated body and now an 
independent non-profit foundation, operates a Chal-
lenge Prize Center which includes a category devoted 
to economic growth.
Perhaps better known are big-ticket technology-fo-
cused prizes, particularly those operated under the 
Xprize brand. These tend to be focused on exponential 
technological innovations and have popular with large 
private sector technology companies to underwrite as 
seen in the Google Lunar XPrize, the Shell Ocean Dis-
covery XPrize and the IBM Watson AI Prize. Many of  
these models informed the development of  prize-based 
competitions such as Big Apps.
Achieving varying levels of  success, these prize compe-
titions sometimes have a nexus with economic develop-
ment, but clearly one aligned with the interests of  the 
corporate sponsor.
Flipping the Model: Amazon HQ2
It is perhaps unsurprising that the interests of  corpo-
rates converge with technology, prize competitions, 
and government policy in the context of  modern eco-
nomic development. Having attempted to moved away 
from offering tax incentives to companies to attract or 
retain jobs many economic developers, including those 
in NYC, recently saw the script flipped on them with 
an interesting cooption of  the prize competition model 
that also included a controversial incentives package.
This cooption of  the model is particularly important to 
understand as it represents a ‘back to the future’ moment 
in terms of  the use of  tax incentive subsidies in inter-ju-
risdictional corporate relocation/expansion wars.
In September 2017 and with much fanfare Amazon, 
the Seattle-based ecommerce giant and one of  the 
most valuable companies in the world, announced 
a competition to search for a second headquarters, 
which rapidly became known as HQ2.
By now, many of  the elements should be familiar. 
A public challenge was issued and amplified in the 
press consistently; a sense of  a “once in a generation 
opportunity” was created; a multi-round process was 
described; a sense of  urgency created by relatively 
short windows to submit for each step and a final deci-
sion timeline of  late 2018. The prize being offered was 
as many as 50,000 jobs with average total compensa-
tion of  $150,000, as well as over $5 billion of  new cap-
ital expenditures—hard for any major city to resist.
By coopting the prize contest model, Amazon effec-
tively turned the tables on local governments. Embed-
ded in the Amazon RFP was an explicit requirement 
to “provide a summary of  the total incentives being 
offered for the Project by the state/province and local 
community.” In fact, the section of  the RFP dealing 
with tax incentives contained the most detailed and 
specific of  all the requested information.
To its credit, the de Blasio Administration swiftly 
attempted to set some ground rules for participation 
by New York City, stating clearly that discretionary tax 
incentives would not be offered.
This public statement concerning discretionary incen-
tives did not appear to have hurt New York’s chances 
as it made the cut17 in to be one of  20 ‘finalists’ from 
238 initial applicants, nor did it prevent the City and 
the State from offering a tax incentive package worth a 
reported ~$3 billion as part of  their winning bid.
That these incentives—at least those offered by the 
City—were largely ‘as of  right’ rather than discretion-
ary (meaning any company bring the proposed level 
of  jobs and real estate development to the proposed 
location would have received a similar package) did 
not, however, persuade the many vocal opponents of  
the deal since announcement. Nor does the fact that 
the incentives are tied to investment (in real estate) and 
the creation of  jobs, that they are paid out over a long 
period of  time, or that—at least according to the State 
economists—the economic activity generated could 
pay for those tax subsidies as much as nine times over.18
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The objections to the Amazon deal, then, were not so 
much grounded in a rational economic evaluation of  
the deal and are much more about process, politics, 
and arguably about a much broader set of  economic 
concerns (income disparity; under-investment in tran-
sit infrastructure; affordability of  housing).
It would also appear that at the last-minute Amazon 
again changed the rules of  the game—this time by 
selecting not one but two cities selected for HQ2, with 
the jobs and economic activity to be split between them.
By doing so, Amazon would have been able to again 
continue the competition, trading the respective offers 
of  these two finalists off against their ‘share’ of  the 
overall prize of  50,000 jobs. And as has been covered 
extensively in recent press, Amazon has also through 
this competition gained access to a treasure trove of  
information—infrastructure plans, population growth 
projections, land use and zoning plans, and more—
for a large number of  major US cities, each of  which 
happen to also be major markets in which Amazon 
sells its products.
Moreover, it would also appear that many of  the com-
petition-based projects started under the Bloomberg 
Administration, such the creation of  the Cornell Tech 
campus on Roosevelt Island and the de Blasio efforts 
to promote Long Island City as a destination for high 
tech industries (LIC includes one of  the City-owned 
sites offered under the Life Sciences Translational Hub 
RFEI and was recently called out by EDC President 
James Patchett as an area with high growth potential) 
were referenced extensively in the EDC’s efforts to 
land Amazon HQ219 and were factors in the compa-
ny’s final decision.
The fierce (and somewhat predictable) backlash20 
against HQ2 in New York City from community and 
advocacy groups, some of  whom are concerned about 
gentrification in the Long Island City neighborhood 
and some of  whom are targeting the broader issues 
of  providing tax incentives to one of  the largest com-
panies in the world21 was in this case accompanied by 
support from a handful of  elected officials and by cer-
tain unions opposed to Amazon’s stance on neutrality 
in the face of  attempts to organize the workplace (note, 
however that other unions who’s members would have 
benefited from the project were in favor). This combi-
nation of  forces and the resulting decision by Amazon 
to withdraw from the New York City HQ2 deal has 
been extensively reported and will doubtless be studied 
in public policy schools for years to come.
One way in which the economic development team in 
the de Blasio Administration might have been able to 
do some coopting of  their own in the case of  the Ama-
zon HQ2 search process would have been by borrow-
ing again from their predecessors. In his 2011 paper 
“How New York City Won the Olympics,” Mitchell Moss of  
the NYU Wagner School of  Public Policy advances the 
argument that by competing in the public challenge 
process for the ‘prize’ of  the 2012 Olympics, a plan 
was introduced which subsequently became the blue-
print for the Bloomberg economic development policy 
led by Dan Doctoroff.
In his recent book, Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big 
Comebac, Doctoroff expands on this to explain how by 
introducing these projects to the public under the aus-
pices of  the Olympic bid enabled the Administration 
subsequently to execute on several of  the same ideas 
having already build buy-in and familiarity with the 
concept, and without the additional costs of  under-
writing the actual games.
“ Hosting the Olympics—or even just bidding on them—
could be the spur to actually get things done that otherwise 
would have been politically infeasible or financially impos-
sible…Perhaps the single most important lesson I learned 
from the Olympic bid was the importance of  storytelling. 
Without a compelling narrative that articulates the problem 
and the opportunity, the process of  selling a complex idea 
is much harder.”
‘Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big Comeback,’ 
Daniel L. Doctoroff, p.341 and p. 348
While the de Blasio Administration in the initial stages 
of  responding to Amazon called for developers and 
landlords to participate in the proposal being made 
by NYC via an EDC-issued Request for Expressions 
of  Interest, there have been comparatively few details 
released to the public about what was received by EDC 
as a result of  this RFEI process or indeed about what 
the City submitted in its bid to Amazon.
With NYC ultimately selected as (one!) winner, this may 
of  course have been the smartest move. But another 
approach borrowed from Bloomberg, Doctoroff et al 
would have been to run a much more public process 
to source ideas and projects. Using the Amazon bid 
as an equivalent to the Olympic bid, team de Blasio 
could have introduced numerous large scale and excit-
ing development possibilities to communities across 
the City.
In doing so the Mayor and his team would admittedly 
have run some political risk. As the backlash demon-
strated, Amazon and other large tech companies 
are far from universally popular, and any plans for 
large scale development in NYC inevitably have their 
opponents, often raising legitimate concerns. Still, 
putting these ideas out ‘into the bloodstream’ under 
the rubric of  an Amazon response, even if  infor-
mally, may have produced some surprisingly positive 
responses and generated some innovative new ideas. 
Despite claims that Amazon enforced strict non-dis-
closure conditions on competition participants, it is 
not beyond the wit of  savvy economic development 
professionals and city administrators to find ways 
around such constraints.
A more public bid response would also have surfaced 
some natural constituencies in favor of  the project, 
would have drawn out some inter-neighborhood com-
petition (on which New Yorkers tend to thrive—Ama-
zon for Queens! No, Bring Amazon to the Bronx! 
etc.)—and inoculated the final result somewhat against 
charges of  it being a ‘backroom deal lacking account-
ability and transparency.’
Amazon’s decision to walk away from the proposed 
NYC HQ2 project is for sure a loss for the city and 
for the growing tech sector, but not an insurmountable 
one. One silver lining is that there will be less competi-
tion for hiring of  technical talent which will help New 
York’s home-bred growth startups.
And as this fascinating and hugely ambitious project 
unfolds at the second site in Arlington, VA, it will likely 
demonstrate both all the upsides and the all downsides 
of  competition models and provide a rare comparative 
study of  approaches to economic incentives packages. 
Many of  these downsides are discussed in the section 
which follows.
Criticisms of Competition Models
The types of  competition models described in this 
paper are not without their critics. Poorly designed or 
carelessly implemented competitions can certainly fail 
to achieve their stated objectives and, as a result, waste 
scarce resources.
Normative Concerns
Some critics take issue with the concept of  such com-
petitive models, rather than with the mechanics of  
implementation. For example, high profile compe-
titions to solve difficult scientific challenges, such as 
those launched by the US Federal government, may 
provide these governments with cover to reduce basic 
investments in science and technology research. A few 
highly visible prizes are certainly no substitute for a 
well-funded system of  discovery and invention.
Lack of Sustainability
Similarly, because economic development competi-
tion models tend to be ‘point solutions’ they are also 
by definition transitory. Problems which require a pro-
longed focus over a long period of  time and/or those 
which require broad societal interventions are not well 
suited to such models.
Inclusion and Participation
Other critics focus on issues of  participation and disen-
franchisement. Certain economic development mod-
els reply on participants expending, in aggregate, a 
level of  their own resources disproportionate to those 
resources being offered through the prize. While this 
represents the ‘leverage’ being achieved by the com-
petitive model, it also implies that participants must 
have access to resources in the first place to be able 
to participate. Being able to expend resources (time, 
money, expertise, etc.) towards an uncertain outcome 
by design will prevent certain individuals, groups and 
organizations from even taking part. This can lead 
to negative selection bias in the competitor group, in 
addition to sub-optimal outcomes if  the central objec-
tive of  the competitive model is to uncover novel ideas 
or solutions to an intractable problem.
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Designed Bias
Additionally, and related to the issue of  selection bias in 
the competitor set, the solutions designed by competi-
tors may end up “designing out” the needs of  import-
ant constituencies or addressing only the needs of  those 
who have shared interests with the pool of  competitors.
Incumbent Favoritism
And, while open competition models may certainly 
draw new resources and players to an economy there 
can also be dislocation effects on incumbents. These 
effects are often seen in areas secondary to the issue 
being addressed through the competition. For exam-
ple, running a competition to create a new educational 
institution may result in an increase of  students and 
faculty in the jurisdiction, but may also lead to incum-
bents facing a reduced share of  scarce resources such 
as philanthropic funding (if  the pool of  such funding is 
relatively static).
Privatization of Public Resources
Prize competitions such as Applied Sciences NYC 
offer a non-renewable public asset (land) as part of  
the prize incentive. Some critics feel that transferable 
of  such non-replenishable assets to the private sector 
(although, in the case of  Cornell Tech the land is trans-
ferred to a not-for-profit under a very long-term lease) 
is not an appropriate use of  such resources. That is a 
legitimate stance based on a political philosophy, but 
there is little evidence that such transfers are inherently 
bad from the point of  view of  efficient economic devel-
opment.
Renting Jobs
Prize competitions which include tax incentives such as 
that launched by Amazon in their HQ2 bid are open 
to numerous criticisms around both the efficiency of  
outcomes (it is possible to produce studies which show 
the public gets a raw deal on ‘bang for the buck’ on 
tax subsidized projects), and on corporate welfare and 
regulatory capture. Additionally, depending on how 
readily relocatable the economic activity and the time 
horizon of  the incentives, the ‘winning’ jurisdiction 
may simply be renting jobs, which can often be sub-
optimal from a net economic impact perspective and 
is certainly not a solid strategy for long term growth.
Public Relations
Lastly, some critics argue that prize competitions are 
“full of  sound and fury,” amounting to little more than 
sophisticated PR campaigns. This is particularly the 
case when a competition is poorly designed in terms 
of  both the objectives (usually overly broad) and the 
metrics which will be used to define success.
Advice for Policymakers
As illustrated in the preceding section, prize competitions 
are not a panacea. Fortunately for economic developers 
however, these models are now sufficiently widespread 
and have been around for long enough that it is possible 
to identify some basic guidelines which address many of  
the criticisms and help increase the chances of  success.
Problem definition: hammers and nails
First amongst these guidelines is to identify under what 
circumstances prize-based competition models may be 
a helpful tool. If  policymakers have a clearly defined 
need and if  there is a ready and well-functioning mar-
ket for solutions which meet that need traditional pro-
curement mechanisms will be far more efficient than 
any other approach.
Similarly, if  the issue being addressed lends itself  to leg-
islative intervention then competitions will at best play 
a limited support role. For example, in attempting to 
address the issue of  income inequality a prize-based 
competition might be used to uncover novel solutions 
to address one component of  the root cause (such as 
unequal access to education addressed via a low-cost 
online delivery model) but legislation creating a universal 
basic income or reforming national tax law would likely 
be a far more important and impactful intervention.
Once it has been established that the issue does lend 
itself  to a competition model approach, a number of  
considerations come to the fore:
• Which type of  entity is best placed to run the 
competition? In some cases, government will 
be the best entity to actually design and run the 
competition. For example, in competitions seeking 
novel solutions for defense technologies the DoD 
has the policy mandate, technical expertise, and
• What are the ultimate outcomes being targeted? In 
their paper “The Craft of  Incentive Prize Design” 
a team from consulting firm Doblin Deloitte 
identify this as a vital and early consideration. 
Competitions for which the key objective is to 
source new ideas, technologies, and markets have 
different design requirements from those where the 
main outcome being sought is to raise awareness 
and mobilize action around an issue. By spending 
sufficient time on ensuring a tight definition 
of  outcomes and how those will be measured, 
competition designers make the subsequent tasks 
of  identifying necessary inputs and outputs far 
easier. One tool which may be helpful in this is 
to develop a problem statement which passes 
the Goldilocks test. As explained in their paper, 
the Deloitte team defines this as a statement of  
challenge with objectives neither too hard (no one 
will will) nor too easy (won too quickly and non-
optimally), is broad (to maximize participation 
and diversity) but not overly so (erodes submission 
quality) and which appropriately matches the 
problem with the level of  resources that need to be 
invested by participants to solve it.
• What type and level of  incentive is required to 
achieve the desired outcomes? Ensuring that the 
correct incentive is being offered to match the 
targeted outcomes is obviously a key step in design 
of  any competition. Competitions often fail when 
designers start with the prize (“X million dollars; a 
plot of  land; a breakfast with the mayor) and then 
attempt to attach that to a big, bold outcome. As 
an example, in a small city offering recognition/
promotion may be insufficient incentive to install 
a free public 5G wireless network since the scale 
of  the pilot is sub-optimal and the promotional 
benefits limited. If  target outcomes are clear, 
government policymakers with limited resources 
can design around the incentive problem by 
seeking strategic partners as co-sponsors. In the 
example of  the 5G network, the small city could 
band together with a number of  other cities and/
or with a relevant philanthropic foundation to 
increase the scale of  the project and provide a 
greater incentive to participants.
Creating value from underutilized resources
An additional consideration for prize designers is 
whether they can offer incentive or competition 
resources which are in some way unique and cost-
less to the host organization. Those running compe-
titions often need to identify resources within their 
own organizations that can be helping in unlock-
ing participation and innovation, but they are also 
usually under pressure to keep costs low. Data is an 
excellent example of  such a resource. Government 
entities often hold vast troves of  data, but often do 
not have the time or expertise to utilize this data in 
ways beyond the primary purpose for which is was 
collected. By engaging the internal ‘gatekeepers’ to 
this data in the right way, competition designers can 
make available to external parties a unique resource 
at low or zero cost (to the host organization).
Ownership, authority, control and cadence
• Who will own the fruits of  the efforts? The 
submissions to such competitions often have 
intrinsic and potential economic value. Whether 
it be a new app to help people navigate a transit 
system or a way to deliver cargo into space, it is 
critical to be clear from the start on who will own 
the intellectual property and commercialization 
rights associated with the submissions. Granting 
these rights to participants can form an important 
element of  the overall incentive. It can also 
exacerbate the types of  problems discussed in the 
preceding section if  competition designers are 
not careful to address issues of  inclusivity and 
selection bias.
• What legal authorities are needed? Related to the 
above, and of  particular relevance to government 
policymakers, it is essential to carefully think 
through legal issues and constraints well ahead 
of  time. Of  particular importance is to establish 
the authority under which the administering 
entity is empowered to offer the ‘prize’ (and 
checking prizes do not run afoul of  conflict 
of  interest rules), to be clear on what is and is 
not a “procurement,” and to ensure that those 
proposing ideas or prototypes as participants are 
not conflicted out of  any subsequent procurement.
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• What is the correct duration for and cadence of  
the competition? Some economic development 
competitions seek to solve a single issue with a 
single solution—one and done. Other types of  
competition naturally lend themselves to being 
run on an ongoing cycle, often annual. The 
cadence of  the competition will be informed by the 
outcomes being sought and the resources available 
for incentivizing participation. Additionally, 
competitions seeking multiple outcomes might 
work best when broken into different phases or 
stages. The typical example of  this would be where 
designers seek to both engage a broad constituency 
to generate a large set of  novel ideas but also want 
to increase the probability of  these novel ideas 
being adopted. In phase one, the organizers could 
make a broad call for concepts, focusing resources 
on marketing and communicating and offering 
a low level of  incentive beyond the chance to 
participate. In a subsequent phase, administrators 
could offer some seed funding plus the incentive of  
a ‘grand prize’ to a much smaller subset of  the most 
promising proposals which would be turned into 
working prototypes.
Adaptability and Definition of Success
• How might the model need to change over 
time? Related to but distinct from considerations 
of  cadence is thinking through how the 
competition model might need to adapt over 
time. By incorporating flexibility from the start, 
competition designers can save significant time 
and effort downstream. Establishing separate 
‘tracks,’ for example, enables future iterations of  
a competition to be revised to address issues of  
participant inclusion should these become apparent 
after an initial round or cycle. Equally important 
closely tied to success metrics which are discussed 
next is building in a ‘kill switch,’ particularly for 
competitions administered by public entities. By 
setting clear criteria for success and resource renewal 
up front, administrators can provide themselves 
with an exit from repeat competitions where the 
activity is popular with an important or influential 
constituency but is not (or no longer) generating 
the impact initially sought or where the policy issue 
being targeted has simply become less acute.
• How will success be measured? Perhaps most 
challenging of  all is defining and tracking metrics 
for success. Activity metrics for inputs and 
outputs (number of  participants, events held, 
and so forth) comparatively easy to measure and 
therefore frequently included in design. Much 
more challenging is to identify metrics which are 
truly outcomes-based. Smart designers will give 
significant thought to this piece of  the puzzle and 
will sometimes even ‘outsource’ evaluation to an 
expert objective third party.
Conclusion:  
Why Should Anyone Care?
As discussed, challenge or prize-based competition 
models in the economic development arena are far 
from being a solution to every problem. However, 
with public resources increasingly being reduced (in 
particular at the federal and state levels) there is more 
pressure on localities to leverage external resources. A 
hyper-specialized world requires multiple parties (gov-
ernment, private sector, philanthropy, academia) to 
work together to solve our most intractable economic 
challenges, while the increased mobility of  capital and 
talent in the tech-enabled knowledge economy mean 
competition for economic growth between jurisdic-
tions is only intensifying. Taken together these factors 
argue strongly in favor of  challenge models as another 
tool which should be at the disposal of  economic 
developers and other interested parties. Like any tool, 
learning the basics is a good idea before attempting to 
use it in real life. This paper attempts to provide some 
general guidelines for how to get the most out of  prize 
competition models and illustrates those guidelines in 
action through a review of  their practical use in both 
the Bloomberg and the de Blasio administrations in 
New York City.
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